4. The 1984/85 Miners' Strike and women's roles
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The background to the Miners' Strike 1984/85
4.2.1 The run-down of the industry 1947-1984
4.2.3 A short chronology of the strike
4.2.4 What was the Miners' Strike about?
 |
This chapter will attempt to show if and how the roles of women in mining communities changed in the Miners' Strike 1984/85. A short introduction to the strike - its origins and the course it took - opens the chapter, followed by a description of women's activities during the strike and by a comparison of their activities with women's activities in former disputes. In order to obtain a more complete picture of women's roles during and after the strike and of the way they see themselves publications by the women will be examined from this point of view. The chapter closes with an assessment of women's roles during and after the strike.
|
4. 2. 1 The run-down of the industry 1947-1984
Having reached its peak of production in 1913 the British coal industry continuously contracted, the two world wars brought only short-term recovery. Collieries had always been closed when the seams were exhausted or when no more coal could be mined because of adverse geological conditions. The miners had known this for centuries. After 1913, however, more pits were closed than sunk.
For the British coal industry the year 1947 was a very important year: The Nationalisation Act of the year before nationalised the industry on January 1, 1947. The miners thought a new era had begun with workers' control of the industry and with an end to exploitation. Their hopes came only partly true.
In 1947 the National Coal Board not only took over the coal industry but also debts of about 358 million pounds which had been paid to the former mine owners in compensation. At the same time the demand for coal increased in the post-war years. Therefore the industry had to produce as much coal as it could. There was no money for large-scale modernisation which could have made the mines more efficient and would have delayed pit closures.
Although the 'Plan For Coal' from 1950 predicted increases in production the conservative governments of the 1950s pursued a different energy policy: Nuclear energy and oil should replace coal as soon as possible. Some years later, in 1957, the government tried to keep the coal price as low as possible in the home market, the NCB bore the losses. Cheap oil from the Middle East weakened coal's market position even further. The NUM about this: "'In our opinion it is clear that imported oil is being given a priority over coal because of the political and economic power wielded by the oil interests. '" (quoted in T. Hall: 79).
Pit closures on a large scale followed in the 1960s. Between 1956 and 1974 the workforce was reduced by two-thirds, 3/4 of the collieres were closed and production sank to about 1/2. Nuclear energy also added to the coal industry's decline. The nuclear power station at Hartlepool alone cost about 5,000 jobs in the Durham coalfield (cf. North East Trade Union Studies Information Unit: 6).
Here are some numbers:
1. Great Britain:
|
2. North East Area
|
In the 46 years between 1926 and 1972 the National Union of Mineworkers hardly fought against these pit closures. "The rundown of the industry in the 1950s and 1960s was accepted with relative acquiescence by the National Union of Mineworkers and their successive communist general secretaries Horner and Paynter." (K. O. Morgan: 283). Full employment and a policy of 'social consensus' probably were the reasons for the NUM's passiveness.
Two national miners' strikes in 1972 and in 1974 made the importance of coal aware to the public: The oil crisis of the early 1970s brought up the price of oil enormously. Between 1970 and 1973 it rose by about 600%! This strengthened the miners' position in their fight for pay rises.
A new Labour government drew up a new 'Plan For Coal'. "The Plan for Coal, agreed in 1974, signalled the turn-around. The industry was to be expanded through a huge investment programme. Deep-mined output would be 120 million tonnes by 1985." (D. Thomas: 31-32). Production was to be increased mainly by developing coal reserves which had been unmineable before. "A new mood of optimism entered the industry with Plan for Coal. But, in the event, the government and the NCB failed to keep their side of the bargain. Less coal was mined last year [1983] than when Plan for Coal was signed and coal's share of the energy market has fallen." (D. Thomas: 32). But the Labour government concentrated on nuclear energy as well. In 1975/6 51. 4% of the Department of Energy's budget went into research of nuclear energy but only 7. 4% went into the development of coal technology, even less, 4. 3%, into alternative energy sources (numbers from North East Trade Union Studies Information Unit: 7).
The election of a conservative government in 1979 forwarded nuclear energy even more. 'Plan For Coal' no longer was the guideline for the government's energy policy. On the contrary: It powerfully pursued a policy away from coal. There are several reason for this:
The government under prime minister Margaret Thatcher pursued a monetarist policy: Private ownership and free market economy, as little state intervention as possible. The coal industry was not privately owned and it was heavily subsidised. Therefore the government took it in their hands to privatise the coal industry. First steps towards this were the Coal Industry Act from 1980 which replaced production targets (which the 'Plan For Coal' laid down in 1974) by financial targets. These financial targets were set so high that they could only be met by closing so-called uneconomic pits. This policy was strengthened by the MMC's advice to reorganise the NCB into "area units of accounting"(North East Trade Union Studies Information Unit: 8) which made it impossible to compensate losses in some areas with gains in others. All of these measures were to make the coal industry more attractive for private investors. Another important step was to rename the NCB 'British Coal' in 1985.
The conservative government showed a hostility to the labour movement in general and to the miners in particular. The miners were still seen as the archetypal proletarians (despite their comparatively small number) and Edward Heath's defeat in 1974 was still ascribed to the miners. Margaret Thatcher who had been member of the cabinet of Edward Heath wanted to avoid such a defeat: She prepared very carefully for a dispute with the miners. In 1981 she avoided a strike by yielding to the miners' demands. "The truth is that the government was not ready to sit out a prolonged strike with the miners." (G. Goodman: 23). The Coal Industry Act was taken back too.
|
The Ridley Report from 1978 became the government's guideline for its energy policy. In the appendix to this report, which examined the future of the national industries and their privatisation, a number of measures was proposed for a preparation of the state for a dispute with the miners - as the most probable among the national industries:
* coal stocks were to be increased
* as soon as possible power stations should turn from coal firing to oil firing
* coal imports were to be increased
* transport companies should employ non-union drivers
* welfare benefits were to be cut for strikers and their families
* a special mobile squad of police should be set up "to deal with any social disorder arising from picketing and industrial violence." (G. Goodman: 29).
The government kept close to the recommendations of the Ridley Report. At the end of 1981 NCB directors and CEGB regional chairmen were instructed to begin stockpiling of coal. At the same time the Department of Energy was ordered by the cabinet to increase the use of oil in power stations, a hard blow to the coal industry which in 1983/84 sold approximately 70% of its produce to the CEGB. Coal imports were encouraged. "In May 1980 the Social Security (no 2) Bill was introduced giving the DHSS power to assume that workers on strike are receiving strike pay and reduce benefits on this basis." (North East Trade Union Studies Information Unit: 8).
Very far-reaching were the measures concerning the police:
"During 1982 Scotland Yard and the Home Office made plans to change police training methods with industrial unrest very much in mind. Mobile riot-squad police had already been introduced to some of the major cities: they were very much in evidence in London, especially in zones of racial tension. And under cover of special training, ostensibly designed to deal with operative IRA cells, police training was substantially changed between 1981 and 1984. Police were also singled out for pay increases well beyond the general industrial norm." (G. Goodman: 33).
On September 1, 1983 Ian MacGregor, who in the USA and later at the BSC had proved his anti-union position, became chairman of the NCB. For Margaret Thatcher he seemed to be "an ideal figure to take on Scargill and the miners." (G. Goodman: 27).
At the end of winter, when preparations were almost finished and the trade union and labour movement seemed to be little inclined for a fight, the National Coal Board announced the closure of Cortonwood colliery as well as further cuts in production with a loss of 20,000 jobs.
Yorkshire miners came out on strike on March 6, a date generally regarded as the beginning of the Miners' Strike 1984/85.
|
To examine women's roles in the strike it is not necessary to know the exact course of events which can be read about in the respective publications. Here only a short outline of the events will be given (mostly followingG. Goodman: 1-12):
March 1984
- Yorkshire miners went on strike (March 6), miners in Durham and Kent followed (March 9). On March 12 the strike started nationally.
- Twenty-four year old David Jones was killed while on picket duty at Ollerton colliery, Yorkshire (March 15).
- Power unions advised their members to cross NUM picket lines (March 22)
- NUR, ASLEF, Transport Salaried Staffs' Association, TGWU and ISTC agreed upon a blockage of coal in support of the NUM (March 29)
April 1984
- Nottinghamshire miners voted against a strike and decided to work. (April 5)
- The NUM executive changed its rules: A simple majority was sufficient to call a strike (before 55% had been necessary).
- A MORI poll showed a majority of 68% in favour of the strike.
May 1984
- Clashes with the police at Raivenscraig steelworks ended with three men injured and 65 arrested when police broke up a picket line (May 8).
- Barnsley Women Against Pit Closures organised a women's march. Women from all over Britain took part (May 12)
- Anne Scargill was arrested for 'wilful obstruction' at Silverhill colliery (May 16).
- First meeting of NUM and NCB since the strike began lasted less than thirty minutes (May 23).
- About 5,000 people picketed the Orgreave coking plant. 82 were arrested, among them Arthur Scargill, and 62 people injured (May 29/30).
June 1984
- The Daily Mirror revealed how the government weakened the rail workers' support for the miners by giving in to their demands (June 5).
- 12,000 people demonstrated in London on the occasion of a House of Commons debate on the strike. 100 people were arrested (June 7).
- Talks of NCB and NUM taken up again in Edinburgh (June 8).
- The miner Joe Green was killed at Ferrybridge power station by a lorry (June 15).
- About 3,000 police and 10,000 miners fought the heaviest battle of the strike. 93 arrests. Arthur Scargill injured (June 18).
- In the Sunday Times Jean McCrindle proposed associate membership for miners' wives in the NUM.
July 1984
- Home Secretary William Whitelaw allowed the application of the criminal law instead of the civil law against the miners.
- NUM and NCB enter into new negotiations. There was a chance of bringing their positions into line (July 5-9).
- A national dock strike was called because workers who were not members of the TGWU unloaded coal.
- The government kept about £6. 8 million tax repayments from the miners.
- The national dock strike was called off (July 21).
- The first conference of National Women Against Pit Closures was held at Northern College, Barnsley (July 22).
- Chancellor Nigel Lawson announced the strike had cost already £300-350 million. "'Even in narrow financial terms it represents a worthwhile investment for the good of the nation'." (quoted in G. Goodman: 6) (July 31)
August 1984
- NWAPC organised a rally in London. The women handed over a petition to the Queen (August 11).
- Miners slowly began to drift back to work.
- For the first time the TUC discussed the Miners' Strike (August 22).
- A second dock strike was called when British Steel- workers unloaded coal in Hunterston (August 23).
- Striking miners visited the peace camp in Greenham.
September 1984
- After three weeks the second dock strike was called off.
- The Bishop of Durham, David Edward Jenkins, demanded MacGregor's resignation.
October 1984
- Meanwhile the strike had cost £600 million.
- The unemployment rate climbed to 13. 6% (3,284,000) (October 5).
- ACAS took up negotiations with NUM and NCB (October 6).
- Greenham Common women donated food to the support groups.
- Talks with ACAS ended without positive result (October 15).
- The pit deputies' union NACODS announced a national strike (October 16).
- NACODS called off the strike after the NCB had made concessions to them (October 23).
- NUM funds were seized by a court decision (the NUM had failed to pay a £200,000 fine) (October 25).
- Talks with ACAS were stopped.
- The NCB tried to lure miners back to work with Christmas bonuses.
- The Christmas Appeal 1984 was launched.
November 1984
- A Mines Not Missiles rally was held in York (November 3).
- A national conference of the Women's Action Groups took place in Chesterfield (November 10-11).
- About 1,900 miners had returned to work (November 12).
- Taxidriver David Wilkie was killed by a concrete block thrown from a bridge through the roof of his taxi. Wilkie took a working miner to a colliery in South Wales.
December 1984
- Toys for miners' children came from all over the world.
- The Christmas Appeal was published in the press.
- Nottinghamshire miners decided to make their area more independent (December 11).
January 1985
- Return to work continued slowly
- 620 miners had been sacked since March 1984 and only 38 had been reinstated.
February 1985
- South Wales and Durham wanted to end the strike (February 26).
- According to NCB figures 50% of the miners had returned to work.
March 1985
- The NCB announced the end of the strike without settlement (March 3).
- The miners march back to their collieries together with women and children (March 5).
|
Unlike all former national miners' strikes the Miners' Strike 1984/85 was not about pay rises, shorter work hours or improved working conditions. It was about something far more basic: miners' jobs and consequently the mining-communities.
|
It seems to be paradoxical that miners defended what they had, almost traditionally, condemned: The jobs in the pits.
Almost every miner did not want his son to work in the pit. He knew the dangers and risks of working there and he knew of the price many miners and their families had to pay. But there were hardly ever any other jobs in mining communities and most men and youths ended working in the pit. Another aspect was that the pit always offered a job in case someone was not qualified for another.
Job prospect had steadily worsened until 1984: Unemployment rose from 2% in 1955 to almost 20% in 1985 (c. f. North East Trade Union Studies Information Unit: 14). And still the collieries often were the largest and only employers in mining communities:
"'Coalfield communities have a distinctive employment structure. In 1981, the most recent date for which local statistics are available, coal provided just under 30 per cent of the jobs for men - 214,000 out of three quarters of a million. . . The dependence on coal and manufacturing poses tremendous problems for coalfield communities. It is not merely that they lack diversity and are vulnerable to job losses in their main industries: structural changes in the national economy also disadvantage them. '" (S. Fothergill / G. Gudgin; quoted in G. Goodman: 15).
So the jobs in the pits were as important to the community as they had been for centuries.
|
"When a works closes down, the community dies. I have experienced this, as I come from Esh Winning, just outside Durham. It's a ghost town now, the nearest pit is about 24 miles away." (P. Clarney: 27). This statement makes clear what the existing mining communities will undergo when their pits are closed. In the past many communities had been spared this fate because miners whose pit had been closed had been transferred to other pits or other industries. In 1984 this possibility was no longer open because of a high unemployment rate and the general contraction of the mining industry. The concequences for the communities are higher unemployment, less spending power, moving away of small businesses and of young people who try to find a job elsewhere. The people in mining communities did not want to face these prospects and just stand by - they tried to save their communities in 1984. "What the miners, like most of us, mean by their communities is the places where they have lived and want to go on living, where generations not only of economic but of social effort and human care have been invested, and which new generations will inherit. Without that kind of strong whole attachment, there can be no meaningful community." (R. Williams, 1985: 8). This the miners and their families set out to defend. Raphael Samuel talked of the spirit of the strike as a "radical conservatism [. . . ][,] it was a defence of the known against the unknown, the familiar against the alien, the local against the anonymous and the gigantesque." (R. Samuel, 1986 b: 22). "Job security, personal dignity were, on the miners' side, the issues at stake in the strike; family, hearth and home the most potent of its mobilising appeals; 'old-fashioned' values its continual point of reference." (R. Samuel, 1986 b: 23).
It were mainly these aspects which mobilised the women in the mining communities.
